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Marine and coastal areas contain many resource types, with many uses and user groups. 
Conflicts are common, both over access to the same resource, and to avoid negative effects of 
others’ use. Such conflicts are expected to increase in extent and severity. Being able to 
analyze and understand the nature and consequences of the interactions between different user 
groups, how it affects their behaviour in planning and other processes where resource 
allocation and rules of use are decided, as well as finding management schemes and 
instruments that can replace or complement the existing ones, to better deal with these 
conflicts, are important. This thesis contains attempts to do all of this, for specific situations. 
It includes a bioeconomic model to analyse three types of possible externalities of aquaculture 
on fisheries. We consider how asymmetric externalities of resource use can affect the 
behaviour of users in contests or bargaining over resource access, and how a regulator’s set-
up of these can affect outcomes. Schemes for tradable rights to coastal resources between 
user-groups, particularly their design and how to account for external effects on third-parties, 
are considered. This includes how power relations can be affected by the introduction of such 
schemes, and the further effect on institutional efficiency, influenced by the possibilities for 





Marine and coastal areas contain a vast array of resource types, with many different uses, and 
many user groups (Cicin-Sain et al. 1998). Conflicts over resource access are common, partly 
because several want access to the same resource, and partly to avoid external effects of 
others’ use. Conflicts will increase in the future, as human populations grow, and new 
stakeholders continue to enter (Hassan et al. 2005). 
 
There are several major types of interactions between actors investigated in economics. These 
are i.a. those through markets (for goods, services and rights), external effects, how regulators 
try to affect actors’ economic activities, and how actors try to influence the decisions of 
authorities or other types of decision makers. When authorities regulate economic activities it 
is by command-and-control measures, taxes or subsidies of some sort, or by creating markets 
for use rights.1 Regulations are often to correct for market failure, of which the presence of 
externalities is a common cause. Trying to influence decision makers is done by participation 
in formal policy formation processes (public hearings, committee membership, etc), but also 
lobbying and bribing. Using resources to influence such decisions for personal gain is in 
economics called rent-seeking (Tullock 1993). Social scientists are (naturally) also concerned 
with how actors can influence decisions and behaviour, and the power of individuals and 
organisations is a crucial concept. Russell (1938) writes that it is as fundamental in the social 
sciences as energy is in physics. Mainstream (neo-classical) economists have only been 
                                               




concerned with power to a limited degree (Bartlett 1989; Schutz 2005), usually restricted to 
market power (e.g. Tirole 1988) and bargaining power (e.g. Muthoo 1999).  
 
The economics approaches above focus largely on conflict-ridden interactions, but 
interactions can also enable positive developments and finding solutions. Power encompasses 
both the conflictive and enabling dimensions. Power relations are affected by legal structures, 
management systems’ design, as well as development in technology, culture and markets and 
more (French and Raven 1959). Economists’ analysis and advice on management system 
design rarely include the “other” dimensions of power, even though it is very important for 
the implementation and functioning of management systems (Jentoft 2007). 
 
The overarching theme of the thesis is the interaction between user-groups in the coastal zone, 
considering both marine and coastal resources. I look at three major topics:  
1. How to represent and analyse externalities relevant for coastal zone management, 
particularly considering biological and ecological aspects? 
2. How does such interactions affect users’ behaviour in processes where allocation of 
resources or use rights is determined;  
3. The possible use of tradable use rights for coastal resources between user groups, 
particularly when interactions are present; how could and should tradable rights 
schemes be designed, and how might they affect power relations and thus institutional 
efficiency? 
 
Together these give a broad perspective on user interactions in the coastal zone. Naturally, I 
only look at some specific questions or examples of questions related to (1-3) in this thesis. 
The three papers (I-III) deal each with at least one of the three issues above; Paper (I) deals 
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with all three of them, but focuses on (1); Paper (II) deals with (2); Paper (III) deals with (2) 
and (3), but focuses on (3).  
Topic 1 - Economic analysis of externalities between 
coastal user groups 
Like much use of the coastal zone, aquaculture and fisheries rely on biological and ecological 
processes occurring there, either for extraction of “biological surplus” or for the services they 
provide. Externalities from economic activities (production or consumption), may affect the 
capacity or rate of reproduction of natural stocks and systems. Basic models of externalities, 
found in environmental economics textbooks like for example Baumol and Oates (1988), can 
be applied to a multitude of real world cases, but only to a limited extent explicitly consider 
such effects. Textbooks on the economics of natural resources do more often consider 
externalities  that “work through” the biology/ecology (e.g. Neher  (1990), Clark (1992)), 
albeit in a rather abstract way. Examples include ecosystem abatement of air pollution (Neher; 
Ch. 12), nature’s reproduction of amenity values (Neher; Ch. 13), external benefits of forestry 
(ecosystem services and recreational values) (Clark; p.275), and the so-called stock 
externality in fisheries, affecting harvesting costs when harvest rates depend on stock size 
(Clark; p.27). The volume of articles in economics journals that consider this type of 
interactions is, however, fairly large and rapidly growing.2 A growing general recognition of 
                                               
2 Some consider interactions based on interactions between biological species (May et al. 
1979; Flaaten 1988; Flaaten 1991), some effects on habitats from economic activities (Barbier 
2003; Armstrong 2007), or the value of ecosystem services in relation to destructive industries 
(Barbier 2007). Partly these consider competing interests, and partly they consider feedback 
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the impact of human activity on ecosystems and stocks of individual species, and also the 
importance they in turn have for human welfare3, will lead to increased growth of economics 
papers on externalities based on biological/ecological linkages.  
 
Paper I models how external effects from aquaculture on fisheries can affect fishing effort, 
fisheries yield and fish stock in equilibrium. The externalities considered are that aquaculture 
may affect wild fish habitat, the growth rate of the wild fish stock, or the efficiency with 
which fishing effort is turned into harvest. It also considers three basic management regimes, 
and whether they can achieve the optimal balance between the two industries, given such 
externalities. The regimes are (1) that aquaculture has a right to use the coast, (2) that a social 
planner decides how much farming and how much fishing shall take place, and (3) that 
fishermen have a right of use of the marine areas, but may allow marine farming, possibly 
against compensation. 
 
I consider aquaculture and fisheries since they are major industries in the coastal zone of 
many countries, including Norway, and conflicts between them are not uncommon. 
Interactions between them have been studied previously, but not much analysis exists on the 
effects that I study, considering both industries simultaneously (see Paper (I) for references).  
 
The Verhulst-Schaefer model  is the classic fisheries economics model of Scott and Gordon 
(Gordon 1954; Scott 1955). It is one of the most influential fisheries economics models, as 
                                                                                                                                                   
of an industry’s activities on themselves, through the effect on the biological and ecological 
system.  
 
3 See for example the “Millennium Ecosystem Assessment” (www.millenniumassessment.org). 
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Wilen (2000) notes in his review of fisheries economics. He thinks the later extensions, in 
which the model has been technically refined, has not nearly shaped policies to the same 
degree as the original simple model. With the rationale that it is the most fundamental 
relations that fundamentally shape policies, it would make sense to analyse the possible 
interactions between aquaculture and fisheries using the same simple model as a basis. 
 
The major conclusion in paper (I) is that the different aquaculture externalities can give totally 
opposite effects on fisheries yield, effort and equilibrium stock levels, even if we only 
consider “negative” externalities.4 If aquaculture leads to a reduction in the habitat’s carrying 
capacity, or the fish stock’s growth, it gives opposite effects than when it reduces fishing 
efficiency (given that the characteristics of the fishery is so that open access would lead to an 
equilibrium stock level below the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) level). 
 
The findings from paper (I) underline the importance of knowing what kind of externalities 
there are between user groups. In reality, there could well be a mix of externalities, and then 
knowing the relative strength of them matters. The policy advice is not to ban activities with 
negative externalities, but rather to invest in knowledge about the nature and likely magnitude 
of the externalities in the actual context. 
 
If one of the industries has a primary right to the coastal resources this will not give the 
optimal allocation of resource access between the industries, unless some sort of side payment 
can be paid for access. The advantage of such a tradable rights regime, compared to a “social 
planner” regime, is that firms are probably better informed on externalities and cost- and 
benefit-functions.  
                                               




The model in paper (I) is simple, but simple models may catch the essence of real world 
situations, making them applicable to many different settings, even though their results must 
be interpreted with care, taking heed of the context . Still, considering effects of aquaculture 
on fisheries using more realistic fish stock models, like Beverton and Holt (1957) year-class 
models, should be done. Empirical work, trying to assess these links in reality, should also be 
done. The amount of nutrients/energy added to marine ecosystems through feeds in finfish 
aquaculture can for example be substantial (Ackefors and Enell 1994). 
 
The tradable rights scheme sketched in paper (I) assumes that the spatial scale of 
management, fish stock habitat and aquaculture externalities all match. If this is not the case, 
other regulating mechanisms are necessary. Such tradable rights schemes are considered in 
paper (III). 
 
In addition to the user interactions between aquaculture and fisheries that I consider, other 
user interactions exist that have only to a limited degree been the subject of economic analysis 
(to the best of my knowledge): For example oil production and fisheries (Exxon Valdez oil 
spill and fisheries (Cohen 1995)), tourism and reduction of natural amenities (scuba diving 
destroying coral reefs (Davis and Tisdell 1996)), marine reserves creation and effects on 
fisheries and tourism (Boncoeur et al. 2002)5, wind power production and fisheries and 
                                               
5 The literature on marine protected areas and marine reserves is rapidly expanding now. The work has so far 
concentrated on the effect of creating marine reserves on fisheries and the targeted fish stocks (Sanchirico and 
Wilen 2001; Flaaten and Mjolhus 2005; Armstrong 2007), in some cases on the bycatch species (Reithe 2007). 
Not much work has been explicitly on the economic value of reserve creation for other users or stakeholders. 
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tourism. No doubt this type of study will be performed to a larger degree in the future, both on 
the theoretical and the empirical level, as coastal development pressures grow. 
Topic 2 - Economics of allocation mechanisms 
Management of the resources in the coastal zone typically combines spatial planning with 
more traditional resource management. It includes top-down management, “negotiated 
economy” (Christensen et al. 2007), co-management (Jentoft 1989), integrated coastal zone 
management (ICZM) (Cicin-Sain et al. 1998) and local management (Ostrom 1990). In all of 
these management regimes the resource users, and other stakeholders, try to influence the 
decision makers. Partly they try to get larger shares of resources, and partly they try to avoid 
negative effects from other’s use. 
 
But how should one understand these planning processes, including the role and actions of 
stakeholders? Resource users and stakeholders either have formal roles in these management 
systems, or they might be able to influence decisions by lobbying, buying influence (bribery 
or political campaign contributions), or as strategic voters (Grossman and Helpman 2002), or 
using their power in other ways (Jentoft 2007). Focusing on interactions between user groups 
it is natural to ask, how is lobbying or planning effort affected by external effects between 
stakeholders? How does this affect the outcome of allocation processes?  
 
Epstein and Nitzan (2006) argue that contest-models can be used to study lobbying in a large 
variety of democratic political environments, capturing the basic relationship between 
government objectives, public policy, and interest groups’ characteristics. Paper (II) considers 
first a contest for resource access or allocation between two players, when there is an 
asymmetric externality. This means there is an externality from player 2 on player 1, but not 
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the other way. In contests players spend costly effort in order to increase their chances of 
winning a prize, or of winning shares of a prize. Chances or shares increase in own effort, but 
fall in opponent’s effort.  
 
The idea is that in an allocation process, actors spend effort, be it man hours or other 
resources, to influence the outcome in their interest. That higher effort leads to higher chances 
of getting one’s wishes fulfilled seems reasonable, at least for some levels of effort; if it is 
overdone it may antagonize the decision maker(s). It can also be interpreted as a simple view 
on lobbying: The one who spends the most on lobbying stands the biggest chance of winning 
the prize. The same goes for bribing and political campaign contributions.  
 
Paper (II) also considers a bargaining game between the actors over the same resource, where 
the contest is one possible threat point for the game. When an externality is present, but the 
regulator is uncertain about the nature of it, he may suggest that the stakeholders try to agree 
on the sharing of resource access. If they cannot reach agreement, the regulator will decide the 
sharing rule, in practice returning to the contest as an allocation mechanism, unless he 
specifically chooses some other allocation. 
 
I find in paper (II) that if the regulator can set up the contest so that the player with the lower 
valuation of resource use spends his effort first, society gets the largest net benefit (given that 
a contest is used for allocation). The net benefit is the users’ benefits from use of the allocated 
resources less the effort they spent in the contest to influence that allocation. With such a 
sequential game, also both the users’ net benefits are maximised. The interests of the regulator 
and both the contestants are thus aligned, assuming that what is best for society is the 
regulator’s objective. Despite this, if the regulator does not know which player has the lower 
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valuation of resource use, he can not expect an honest answer if he asks the contestants who 
should be allowed to move first in a contest. The regulator would really like to give the player 
with the highest effective valuation all of the resources, without a contest, since a contest 
implies wasting resources.  If the underdog (the lower-valuation player) fears the regulator 
will allocate resources directly based on his answer, he will not tell the truth. Hence, the 
regulator must bind himself to arrange a contest for resource allocation, with the order of play 
decided by the players. 
 
If the regulator suggests the two contestants bargain over the sharing of the resource, the 
threat point of bargaining is important for the outcome. The threat point is what the 
contestants get if they do not reach agreement. A threat point of “no allocation” gives the 
outcome with the largest benefit to society. A sharing of the resource is then agreed where the 
recipient of the externality get the same benefit independent of the size and magnitude of the 
externality. The source of the externality, on the other hand, takes the full impact of a negative 
externality, or receives the full benefit of a positive externality. No allocation as threat point 
may not be very credible, though. An obvious alternative is that the regulator says the threat 
point for the bargaining is a contest. When the contest where the higher valuation player 
spends his effort first is threat point, the outcome gives the largest benefits to society. That 
contest is, however, not the contest that maximises societal benefits, as we remember from 
above. Hence it is not credible either, unless the regulator can bind himself somehow. Unlike 
for the contests, the regulator’s interests are not aligned with both players’ in bargaining. 
While the favourite and the regulator share interest over which contest should be used as 
threat point, the underdog gets the highest payoff if a different contest is used as threat point. 
The extra benefits accruing to the favourite when his preferred contest is threat point, rather 
than the contest the underdog prefers, is more than enough to be able to compensate the 
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underdog for a change of threat point. The favourite should thus be able to make the underdog 
accepts as threat point in bargaining the contest the favourite prefer. This means a regulator 
with limited information on the players’ valuation could still achieve the best outcome for 
society through a bargaining game, provided he binds himself to using as threat point the 
contest the players jointly recommend. 
 
 
The solution concept used for the bargaining in my paper is due to Nash (1953). This solution 
concept is probably the most commonly used for bargaining models, but it is not the only 
one.6 The Nash solution concept maximises the product of the gains from the agreement 
(difference between outcome and threat point levels for each player are multiplied). The focus 
is on the efficiency of the allocation, in the sense that the player with largest marginal benefit 
of resource use gets the larger share of the resource. The “fairness” of the initial state does not 
matter in the allocation of additional resources. The Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) solution 
concept allocates resources according to the additional benefit each player could get from 
resource allocation, if each got all of the resource. The solution is thus according to the 
constrained utopia point, where both get the best they can get, independent of the other. In the 
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the ratio of increases in benefits for each player is equal to the 
ratio of total potential increases in benefits. The Nash solution allows the paradoxical result 
that increased marginal benefit of resource use, for example from improved technology, for 
player A, can lead to lower benefits for him in the “new” bargaining solution. The Kalai-
Smorodinksy concept rules out this possibility. However, with the Kalai-Smorodinsky 
concept, the other player could end up with a lower benefit in the “new” bargaining solution, 
                                               
6 The following presentation of different solution concepts owes a lot to  (Clark 1995). See Armstrong (1994) for 
different bargaining theoretic solution concepts compared to real allocations in a fishery. 
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compared to the solution where the technology for player A had not improved. For the 
bargaining game Clark (1995) uses, he writes that the Kalai-Smorodinsky concept may be 
said to include both considerations of equity and efficiency. Other solution concepts are the 
utilitarian and the egalitarian. In the former, allocation is so as to maximise total benefits, in 
the latter, either the increase in benefit can be the same (“equal gains”) or the final benefit 
level can be the same (“equal outcome”). The solution concept chosen for the bargaining 
game clearly affects the outcomes of the game. Which concept is more appropriate depends 
on the setting of the game. Sometimes fairness will have the larger weight (whatever is the 
criteria for fairness), and other times efficiency. If side payments are possible in the 
bargaining game, it opens up for a resource allocation focused on efficiency, in terms of total 
increase in benefits, rather than fairness, as fairness is dealt with through the side payment. 
This is comparable to the general idea in economics, that the issues of efficiency and equity 
can be dealt with separately. 
 
The contest literature includes many models that analyse externalities of effort, but not many 
with asymmetric externalities (see paper (II) for references). Applications to natural resources 
are also rather limited. Using the contest as threat point in a bargaining game over natural 
resource allocation seems (in retrospect!) a rather obvious thing to do. Yet, we only know of 
one other paper where this is done (Grepperud and Pedersen 2003). 
 
Having only two actors is obviously a limitation for the interest of the results. Sometimes 
there are only two stakeholders, but as the interest for coastal and marine resources is 
growing, such situations are more and more unlikely. On the other hand, sometimes the actors 
competing for rights are not individuals, but groups of stakeholders. My model may be 
relevant also for such cases, being similar to other economic analyses of special interest 
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groups’ attempts at influencing policy outcomes (Grossman and Helpman 2002). The internal 
free-riding opportunities, and other possible internal conflicts of interests groups, important 
for their formation and functioning (Olson 1965), would have to be assumed away for this 
interpretation of my model.  
 
Substantial resources are wasted in contests for shares or access to natural resources, as well 
as other places where someone has the power to hand out privileges at their discretion 
(Tullock 1993; Congleton et al. 2007). This is sometimes called rent-seeking. It represents a 
major cost to society, without being productive, and is thus coined directly unproductive 
profit-seeking activities (DUP) (Bhagwati 1982). How the design of the management system 
may affect individual’s power, and thus opportunities for and levels of rent-seeking, is one of 
two major themes in paper (III). 
Topic 3 - Tradable rights between user groups  
Natural resource management has to a large degree relied on direct regulation only (Heal 
2007), but market-based instruments, like tradable rights of use, are becoming more and more 
common (Tietenberg 2002). Example are in fisheries (Hannesson 2005; OECD 2006), air 
emissions (Tietenberg 1999), water use (Thobanl 1997), land use and land conservation 
(Machemer and Kaplowitz 2002), and nature conservation (e.g. endangered species) related to 
land use (Heal 2007).  
 
Tradable rights can limit the overall pressure on a resource, given that the total number of 
rights is limited, and each right is limited as well. Tradability opens up for voluntarily transfer 
from the relatively inefficient users of natural resources to the more efficient ones. A 
relatively long duration of the right opens up for making investments for long term efficient 
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use of the resource, be they in capital, knowledge or the resource itself (see references in 
paper (III)). 
 
Going through the theory and experiences from using tradable rights in many different fields, 
it became clear to me that there might be a potential for wider use of tradable rights to natural 
resources in the oceans and on the coast. While tradable rights are used for some marine and 
coastal resources, they are mainly used for transferability within the same user group, like 
only among fishermen (maybe only among vessels of a certain size range and gear type), or 
only among marine farmers.  
 
In paper (III) I first consider the design of tradable rights schemes for marine and coastal 
natural resources, allowing for trade between different user groups. A major issue is what the 
traded right can be. Is it to a very specific natural resource like a quota for fish of a certain 
species, or can it be an area-based right, basically giving the right to use all resources within 
the area? If and when these different types of rights can give efficient allocation and resource 
use is considered. Based on previous theoretic work, as well as experiences from existing 
tradable rights schemes, ways of dealing with externalities at different spatial scales in the 
coastal zone is proposed.  
 
Secondly, I consider possible effects on power relations of introducing such tradable rights 
schemes. The power relations considered are both between users and managers, as well as 
among users. Power has sometimes been abused in management systems for coastal and 
marine resources, leading to unfair and inefficient resource allocation and use, and there are 
examples where some groups’ short term interests have been met at the expense of the long 




In paper (III) I explain how tradability of use rights between user groups is possible, and that 
it can increase the efficiency of resource use, both for very specific use rights and for area-
based rights. However, I also show that even for the same resource used in a rather similar 
manner, like fish caught in commercial fisheries and marine fishing tourism, the tradability 
poses challenges for the setting of management objectives, like fish stock size and 
composition. Spatial and temporal differences in use by different user groups also represent a 
challenge, but zoning may solve this.  
 
Local external effects can be internalised through tradable area-rights (where local mean they 
are confined to the area defined by the right). External effects outside the area of the right can 
be dealt with through other mechanisms, like regulatory tiering and zoning. With regulatory 
tiering trade in user rights is not restricted, but the actual use of rights must be in compliance 
with local and other regulations.  
 
There will always be a need for regulatory oversight when using tradable rights schemes, to 
protect public goods and services. A task for regulators is to ensure that groups of 
stakeholders with individually small benefits from resource use, but collectively substantial 
benefits, either are protected by direct regulation (like zoning), or are aided in organizing 
themselves as a market actor. Another point is that for market efficiency it should be possible 
to buy a use right and leave it unused, in order to avoid negative external effects that else 
could be generated from its use (Colby 2000).  
 
Some management systems consciously and explicitly leave out tradability of rights, trying to 
safeguard other interests, and to avoid market power determining resource use. Tradability 
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nevertheless often evolves. If limited licenses or quotas cannot be lawfully traded, the entities 
with such associated rights (like e.g. vessels or companies) are traded at prices that clearly 
indicate a high value on the right itself (Flaaten et al. 1995; Hersoug et al. 2000; Hannesson 
2005). When a grey market like that evolves, allocation and use is likely not as beneficial to 
society as if trade and use was consciously regulated. If tradability is the de-facto situation, it 
might be better to consciously set up a system of tradable rights, with appropriate limitations 
on transferability, ownership and use of the right, to avoid negative external and distributional 
effects and achieve or approach sustainability and economic efficiency.  
 
Power can stem from several different bases, as French & Raven  (1959) points out: (1) 
Legitimate power (due to formal position in an organisation); (2) Referent power (due to 
persuasive abilities); (3) Expert power (due to skill and expertise that others need); (4) 
Reward power (due to ability to decide who gets rewards); (5) Coercive power (due to actual 
or potential use of physical force). When rights that previously were handed out at someone’s 
discretion become tradable, those that used to decide allocation lose some of their reward and 
legitimate powers. How weakened their power becomes depends on how he initial allocation 
of the (then) tradable rights is done, and if they have power from other bases.  
 
An obvious fear with tradable rights schemes is that market powers in rights will emerge. 
Economists know about measures to reduce market powers, but the smaller the market, the 
more difficult it is, also due to possible non-market (power) relations between actors affecting 
trade. 
 
When the powers of individual actors in a management system are reduced, these individuals 
become less interesting as targets for lobbying and rent-seeking. The time, money and 
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resources spent on these unproductive activities should then go down. If a reform introducing 
tradable rights only shifts lobbying and rent-seeking to a higher management level, the total 
amount of effort spent on rent-seeking could go up or down. This is since the scale where 
decisions are made affects both level of lobbying, the number of participates, and how often 
lobbying processes will occur, but the changes in these dimensions can go in opposite 
directions as one moves up or down on scale. 
 
Changes in power relations may thus increase efficiency of resource use, but not necessarily 
so. Context matters, as power can be used both destructively and constructively, making it a 
question of who gains and who loses power and how do they use their power. Whether 
lobbying and rent seeking will be reduced also depends on context. The strongest, or at least 
most common, advocates of more rights based approaches in natural resource management 
seem to be economists (Grafton et al. 2006; Wilen 2006; Heal 2007). Economists have 
traditionally not paid much attention to the implementation process related to management 
reforms. However, the performance of management schemes often depends crucially on this. 
We should take into careful consideration how power relations affect implementation of 
management reforms, as well as how they are affected by it. Particularly the initial allocation 
of rights matter, and that invidious market power in rights are not allowed to develop. Even 
though power is difficult to study (Jentoft 2007), more work should be done to try to uncover 
how power has affected management reforms, both the forming and implementation, and also 
how management reforms have affected power relations. 
Concluding comments 
This thesis considers interactions between users and user-groups in the coastal zone from 
several different angles. There are, however, a number of current topics in marine and coastal 
Introduction 
17 
management that I do not explicitly discuss. They include uncertainty (Pindyck 2007), 
ecosystem based management (Pew Oceans Commission 2003; Pikitch et al. 2004), and 
governance (Hilborn et al. 2005). Some of these are nevertheless implicitly considered, e.g. 
the use of zoning, a crucial element in ecosystem based management (Pikitch et al. 2004), is 
an important element in paper (III). When trade of use rights occurs it makes information on 
private benefits and costs of resource use public. This is an additional positive benefit of 
tradable rights schemes (Tietenberg 2002). For ecosystem-based management the need for 
system level indicators, reference points and control rules to be derived and developed has 
been pointed out (Pikitch et al. 2004). An interesting issue is if the information from trade of 
use rights can be utilised there. Hilborn et al. (2005) discuss what they see as important 
dimensions of fisheries governance: 1) The way in which individuals are allowed access to 
the resource; 2) The decision-making structure of the institutions; 3) The spatial scale of 
management; 4) Biological and economic factors of the fishery. All of these are important 
themes in this thesis, and I even consider interactions between them and effects on the 
institutional efficiency of management systems. 
 
Another major issue I do not explicitly consider is the differences between industrial and 
artisanal uses of marine and coastal resources (like in fisheries). Clearly the management 
capacities and infrastructure necessary to make different regulatory instruments work can be 
very different, and hence, different management options are appropriate for different settings 
(Castilla and Defeo 2005). Ostrom (1995) argues that to manage a complex system, you need 
a complex management system, of nested hierarchical levels. The management instruments I 
suggest in paper (II), with tradable rights between user groups, are not in opposition to her 
suggestions. The schemes I suggest can be part of large nested complex management systems, 




Beddington et al. (2007) show how fisheries with ITQs have both been successful and 
disastrous, and the same goes for top-down management. They argue that the most successful 
fisheries management systems are likely to be rights-based to create incentives for efficiency 
and long-term sustainability, to have pre-agreed rules about what to do if critical reference 
points are reached, and also adequate monitoring and enforcement. The second element points 
to the need to avoid that scientific uncertainty leads to delays in management action. It can be 
due to real scientific uncertainty, but also if someone uses the uncertainty to avoid action, 
furthering their own short term interests against the long term sustainability of the resource 
(Pikitch 2001). Pre-agreed rules reduce the possibility for those that normally have power and 
influence to affect short term management decisions. In fact, it reduces their power and 
influence for the short term. I believe these observations are equally valid for the general 
management of marine and coastal resources, as it is for fisheries in particular. 
 
Power abuse in management systems for marine and coastal resources can be a problem, both 
generally and when there are attempts to reform them. Which elements should be added, and 
which removed during a reform, depends on context. The proposals that go against the 
interest of the current dominant powers will meet the toughest opposition. Our study suggests 
that introducing tradable rights can help shift powers in a favourable manner, but it depends 
crucially on how it is implemented.  
 
This thesis has certainly increased my understanding of interactions between stakeholders of 
marine and coastal resources, what their implications may be for resource use, in management 
procedures, and how management systems can be designed and implemented to accommodate 
them. Hopefully, it will also contribute to better use of marine and coastal resources, through 
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better management, to the benefit of current users and stakeholders, as well as those that will 
follow in the future. 
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